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The media and think tanks in China:
The construction and propagation of
a think tank
DECHUN ZHANG
With China’s rapid growth as a regional and global power, think tanks in China have received
increasing attention from politicians and academics, mostly due to the achievements of academic
and processing policies. Recently, collaborations between the media and think tanks have become
increasingly tight. This article aims to explore China’s think tank industry and their relationship
with the media by interviewing two members of staff from one of China’s most prominent think
tanks and observing the Institute for six months. This study has found that China’s think tanks
have a close relationship with the government and the media. The traditional Chinese Confucian
culture and the "bureaucracy-oriented tradition" have a significant role in the think tanks’ political
behavior. This leads the think tanks to play the role of being an advocate of the government.
Although social media, to some extent, liberalizes the work style of China’s think tanks, the think
tanks’ use of social media still follows the traditional media logic to facilitate the government’s
interests. Overall, the study argues that Chinese think tanks show features of being a
“Government-lead non-governmental organization" with a semi-official identity to complement the
official authorities.
KEYWORDS: Think tank; media; social media; international relations; China
T
hink tanks are a developing industry not
only in China but throughout the rest of
the world. According to the 2020 Global
Go to Think Tank Index Report by the Think
Tanks & Civil Societies Program (TTCSP), there
are more than 11,175 think tanks globally, with
3,389 think tanks in Asia. This accounts for the
largest number in the world. Europe and North
America follow Asia. However, the term think tank
is somewhat challenging to define since a think
tank is characterized by being a shifting object.
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Think tanks can be altered by their environment
(culture, economics, history, and political environ-
ment) and they are also subjective because of the
qualifying criteria at the academic level. Generally
speaking, the United Nations Development
Program (2003) defines think tanks as “organiza-
tions engaged regularly in research and advocacy
on any matter related to public policy, are the
bridge between knowledge and power in modern
democracies” (p. 6).
After China’s economic revolution in 1970, it
has experienced almost 50 years of rapid growth.
China has become one of the world’s largest econo-
mies and one of the peer competitors against
America. It is also acknowledged that think tanks
play a significant role in developing a country.
Chinese political leaders have increasingly paid
more attention to the development of the think
tank industry (Qi, 2018; Zhu, 2011). Think tanks in
China have a role in academia and contribute to
the public debate concerning political issues and
even play a role in the policy-making process (Li &
Qi, 2018). Despite the various political issues that
are still sensitive topics to discuss, Zhu (2020)
argues that think tanks have a role in Chinese pol-
itical decisions. Based on the type of sponsor, there
are different kinds of think tanks in China. For
example, there are government-funded think tanks,
private think tanks, and university-funded think
tanks (Li & Qi, 2018). Moreover, different think
tanks mainly focus on various topics such as inter-
national relations, economics, academics, etc.
Meanwhile, the media in China also has a tremen-
dous influence on public opinion and Chinese pol-
itics, although it is strictly controlled by the
Chinese government (Brady, 2008). Moreover,
social media can supply platforms for people to use
to offer political information and a broad range of
discussion forums (Zhang, 2020a). Think tanks, as
independent non-profit organizations, have their
own communication channels (websites, blogs, confer-
ences, publications, etc.). The media and think tanks
have developed a close relationship (Qi, 2018).
However, research on think tanks is relatively limited
and the available research mainly focuses on their
definitions and institutional structures. There is even
less research on ascertaining the relationship between
the media and think tanks.
To explore the relationship between the media
and think tanks, this study used qualitative inter-
views and observations at one of the most promin-
ent Chinese think tanks. This article suggests that
Chinese political think tanks are still influenced by
Confucian culture and political structure with a
relatively low ability to influence policymaking.
China’s think tanks play a more complementary
role as an advocate of the official authorities.
Meanwhile, China’s think tanks with a semi-official
identity regard the media as a public sphere to dis-
seminate the government’s interests. The article
begins with a literature review focused on the def-
inition of think tanks, followed by a summary of
the role of think tanks, the media environment in
China, and the relationship between the media and
think tanks. Afterward, this article reports on the
results based on the interviews and observations.
Finally, all results will be reported and discussed.
Literature review
Think tanks and China
Think tanks can hardly be defined universally but
they can be described using different parameters.
The lack of clear-cut categorization is probably the
cause of so much confusion, disorder, or ignorance
regarding the matter. Rich (2000) stated that think
tanks are independent NGOs that can influence
political processing via their experts to offer ideas.
Weaver (1989) claimed that a think tank is just a
non-profit public policy research industry.
Moreover, a more critical definition posited by
Kelley (1988) is that a think tank is an arrangement
by which millions of dollars are removed from the
accounts of willing corporations, the government,
and the eccentric wealthy and given to researchers
who spend much of their time competing to get their
names in print. Other definitions have been provided
by other authors, focusing on either a single definition
or a classification. For example, Dror (1983) states
that think tanks are excellence islands that apply full-
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time interdisciplinary scientific ideas to the depth of
policymaking or they serve as a bridge between power
and knowledge. Abelson (1996) maintained that think
tanks are independent, non-profit organizations com-
posed of individuals concerned with a wide range of
issues. Although there is no universal definition of
think tanks, scholars generally describe think tanks as
independent non-profit organizations with a dedica-
tion to the general interest.
After Xi took office, he started to highlight the
policy consultation’s role in improving the govern-
ment’s decision-making. Qi (2018) argues that this
situation reflected that the top Chinese political
elites admit that think tanks are necessary for mod-
ernizing China’s governance system. China’s think
tanks could have a critical impact on society, con-
tributing to more than just the academic issues of
our civilization (Li & Qi, 2018). Think tanks could
play a role as strategic political advisors able to
influence policymaking by developing new concepts
and ideas, boosting the success of various political
agents (Zhu, 2020). Weaver (1989) classified think
tanks as universities without students, contract
researchers, and advocacy tanks. However, Chinese
think tanks evolved from China’s actual condition.
There are also many think tanks in China, with
some Chinese think tanks being government-spon-
sored where there are scholars who often work in
patron-client relations with political leaders
(Maxwell & Stone, 2005). Others are based on uni-
versities; some are considered to be private think
tanks (Qi, 2018). According to Abb (2015), there
are some specific differences between American
think tanks and Chinese think tanks based on
financial support, their interactions with officials,
their mission, the media environment, and their
targets. It is a unique feature of the Chinese polit-
ical system that the Chinese government sponsors
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), resulting
in a so-called government-led non-governmental
organization (GONGO) (Yang, 2016). GONGOs in
China mainly receive funding from the government
and receive public funds as an extension of the
state (Froissart, 2013). Abb (2015) also found that
all kinds of Chinese think tanks rely on the
government’s financial support, are hard to
approach, have a more diverse institutional culture,
and face a more strict media environment than
American think tanks. Abb (2015) concludes that
the US think tanks have more broadly targeted
consumers than Chinese think tanks.
More and more Chinese scholars have begun
explore the nature of China’s think tanks. Zhu and
Xue (2007, p. 453) define China’s think tanks “as
stable and autonomous organizations that research
and consult on policy issues to influence the policy
process.” Meanwhile, the Chinese government also
offers an official definition of what a think tank is.
So long as the non-profit organizations research
strategic issues and public policies, they can be eli-
gible for government support and be regarded as
think tanks (Qi, 2018). In other words, China’s
think tanks have Chinese characteristics. Li and Qi
(2018) suggest that Chinese characteristics refers to
the Chinese ways and styles that the think tanks
should embody. Qi (2018, p. 35) further argues that
China’s think tanks “affiliated to the party, govern-
ment, and military are most closely integrated with
the governing system.” No matter what kind of
think tanks are in China (government-sponsored,
university-based, or private), they all have, to some
extent, a close relationship with the party, the gov-
ernment, and the army (Qi, 2018). Overall, think
tanks in China have a close relationship with the
Chinese political authorities.
The Role of Think Tanks in China
Theoretically, in order to analyze the role of think
tanks in policy and policymaking, Foucault’s (1990)
concept of knowledge and power has become a
useful concept (Richardson, 1996; Xue &
Kerstetter, 2018). It is worth noting that either
knowledge or truth is usually regarded as the foun-
dation for establishing or forming power.
Therefore, the policy can be used as a political pro-
cess or as a form of decision-making that may be
appropriated as "truth" by exercising power
(Richardson, 1996, p. 283). Therefore, the intellec-
tuals’ political participation is a result of their
3 v MEDIA ASIA
status as individuals in society, especially in the
political system (Xiao & Dai, 2020). Richardson
(1996, p. 283) argues that intellectuals should pay
more attention to the power behind the policy:
why and who gives the truth (Richardson, 1996, p.
283). Richardson (1996) further concludes that
power not only exists in political structures, institu-
tions, and social relations; it is also expressed
through the language and texts generated by spe-
cific agencies or embedded in institutional contexts.
The two positions of truth and power are not
mutually exclusive and could be readily fused
depending on the policy processes or contexts.
Increasingly more scholars focus on examining
the role of think tanks in policymaking. Barley
(2010) notes that American companies expanded
their contributions to think tanks to increase their
influence on federal government decision-making
in the 1970s and 1980s. Rich (1997, p. 11) defined
think tanks as "independent, non-interest-based,
non-profit organizations that produce and princi-
pally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support
and influence the policy process." However, some
scholars challenge whether think tanks have
enough of an influence on policymaking. Rashid
(2013) notes that think tanks may seek out changes
in the policymakers’ priorities and draw attention
to new or previously unaccentuated policy issues at
the stage of agenda-setting. McGann and Weaver
(2017, p. 3) maintain that think tanks usually serve
as a mediator between the government and the
public; they identify, clarify and evaluate current or
emerging problems or proposals. They play a role
as an informed and independent voice in policy
debates and provide a constructive forum to
exchange ideas among critical stakeholders in the
policymaking process. Garsten (2013, p. 142) sug-
gests that one of the typical features of think tanks
is that they "work to influence agendas outside the
regular decision-making channels" (Garsten 2013,
p. 142), but they have no formal role in politics
(Allern & Pollack, 2020). Although previous
researchers are skeptical about the direct impact of
think tanks on decision-making (Allern & Pollack,
2020; Lalueza & Girona, 2016), it still widely
accepted that think tanks could play a role in
attracting the public imagination (Stone, 2013).
Furthermore, Stone (2013, p. 4) suggests that "by
looking not at the degree of influence but at the
role think tanks see themselves playing, the contri-
butions they see themselves making to the policy
process," one can analyze the role of think tanks in
policymaking.
However, when applied China, it is more com-
plicated. Zhu (2020) suggests that China’s think
tanks conduct professional consultations to influ-
ence decision-making through interpersonal rela-
tionships. Zhu (2011) notes that every think tank in
China, whether it is government-sponsored or a
non-governmental organization, depends on
internal and external factors to determine its role
in the policymaking process. Zhu (2020) suggests
that China’s think tanks are primarily affiliated
with their respective political parties or are organ-
izationally linked to the government. Zhu (2020, p.
298) further maintains that personal ties play a vital
role for the think tanks that “largely depend on the
administrative status of the people in the society in
which orderly hierarchy is deeply embedded by
political power.” In other words, the personal ties
between the political elites and think tanks play a
significant role in China. Zhu (2020) further con-
cludes that China’s think tanks largely depend on
personal relations and the administrative linkages
of policymakers and other political elites to influ-
ence policy rather than public debate. Chinese
Confucian culture and “bureaucracy-oriented” trad-
ition play a vital role in Chinese politics (Zhu,
2020). In China, where there is only one ruling pol-
itical party, think tanks, even those considered to
be non-governmental organizations, inevitably have
more or less of an administrative affiliation with
the Chinese government (Menegazzi, 2017). The
close relationship between think tanks and govern-
ment shapes the organizational structure of
Chinese think tanks (Zhu & Xue, 2007) and its
behavioral strategies when it comes to influencing
policies (Zhu, 2009). Thereby, the connection with
political power is the most critical factor in
Chinese think tanks (Zhu, 2020).
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The close tie between the government and
think tanks implies that China’s think tanks impact
on political policies. Zhu (2011, p. 673) argues that
"as advocates in the public sphere, think tanks have
the opportunity to influence government decision."
Zhu and Xue (2007) define China’s think tanks as
stable and autonomous organizations that research
and consult different policies. To influence politics,
think tanks need to use their expertise to impress
the decision-makers and other political elites (Zhu,
2011). One of the think tanks’ fundamental tasks
are to conduct research and participate in academic
activities. However, Shai (2004) went into more
detail to introduce the role of think tanks in China.
Shai (2004, p. 148–152) concludes that Chinese
think tanks play a role as (1) information filters
that offer political elites their analyses of raw data,
(2) policy defenders that help the current political
leadership to promote and legitimize their position,
(3) promoters of new ideas that introduce new
ideas to the mass media and foreign countries, and
(4) as interlocutors which help the Chinese political
leaders to collect information from foreign
researchers by attending conferences to better help
Chinese policymakers understand foreign powers.
Overall, the Chinese think tanks have a close and
mutual relationship with the Chinese government.
The Media Environment in China
The media in China has a tremendous influence on
public opinion and Chinese politics, so much so
that "in the past few years, people have witnessed
the declining power of the communist party of
China, which is the result of the social and eco-
nomic reform movement" (Huang & Xu, 1997, p.
317). Mass media has undergone structural changes
on the management front. Gang and Bandurski
(2011, p. 38–39) find that "through the period after
1992 can be described as one of commercialization
and structural transformation, the commercializa-
tion of the Chinese media further gained momen-
tum." The Chinese government also opened the
domestic media market for international newspa-
pers and media houses after 2000 (Gang and
Bandurski, 2011). Therefore, some believe that
China’s media could supply a public sphere for
people or organizations to discuss the issues
at hand.
However, whether the media in China contrib-
utes to the public sphere is a contradictory issue.
On the one hand, Zhao (2013) believes that the
party still plays a vital role in the Chinese media
system despite the central government’s apparent
erasure of centralization. The Chinese govern-
ment’s propaganda content has changed signifi-
cantly since the goal has been transformed from an
idealized utopia to the more practical purpose of
promoting its legitimacy (He, 2000; Zhao, 1998).
On the other hand, with the development of more
business and professional media, "supervision by
public opinion and the media have the right to rep-
resent the rights of supervision from the public
officials, which is closer to the news survey reports
and other forms, it is closer to freedom of speech"
(Bandurski & Hala, 2010, p. 31). However, although
China’s media environment seems to have become
freer, it is still widely accepted that traditional
Chinese media is either the government’s mouth-
piece or is closely supervised by the government
(Qi, 2018). Traditional Chinese media thus reflects
the Chinese government’s political position
(Zhang, 2020b).
Meanwhile, alongside the development of
China, social media is becoming increasingly popu-
lar among the Chinese. According to the China
Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC,
2019), approximately 854 million in China are
Internet users, and 99.1% of them, 847 million,
have accessed the Internet via a mobile network up
until June 2019. Simultaneously, the number of
microblog users has increased significantly in the
last decade, from 63 million in 2010 to 350 million
in 2018 (Statista, 2018). Zhang (2020b) argues that
digital media plays an increasingly vital role in
Chinese politics. Shirky (2011) and Morozov (2012)
proffered that social media’s authoritarian regime
role is hotly debated. Some believe that social
media will play a positive role in increasing the
public’s access to information, engaging in public
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speaking, and coordinating massive and rapid
responses that constrain the authoritarian govern-
ments’ ability to act without appropriate oversight
(Shirky, 2011). Furthermore, digital media, like
online forums and social networking sites, is avail-
able for Chinese citizens to use to arrange online
political activities (Fang & Repnikova, 2018).
However, others are more skeptical, either because
they believe that low-cost activities on social media
will act as a replacement for real-world action
("slacktivism") or because they believe that authori-
tarian governments are becoming better at utilizing
the same tools to suppress dissent (Morozov, 2012).
Zhang (2020a) further posits that although viewed
as liberal in the Chinese media environment, social
media also follows the media logic that is domi-
nated by the Chinese government. Overall,
although the previous studies debate the role of
social media in China, it widely accepts that social
media in China could play a role as a public sphere
to reach the public (Fang & Repnikova, 2018;
Zhang, 2020b).
The Media and Think Tanks
Think tanks and the media now have a close rela-
tionship (Cook, 1998; Rich & Weaver, 2000). Cook
(1998) suggests that media visibility is one of the
think tanks’ tasks, and this situation has became
increasingly popular (Misztal, 2012). Abelson (2013)
even argues that media visibility has become the
main primary factor used by the think tank to
measure its effectiveness. Think tanks build media
relations departments to control any press inquiries
and to maintain a close relationship with different
media outlets in order to gain more attention from
the media (McDonald, 2014). Consequently, the
think tanks’ ability concerning policy recommenda-
tions has been dramatically improved (McDonald,
2014). Overall, Lalueza and Girona (2016) further
concluded that having a close relationship with the
media is the most common strategy through which
think tanks mobilize the public opinion on political
communication.
Moreover, some scholars also argue that the
media and think tanks have a mutual relationship
(Hall et al., 1978). Rashid (2013) suggests that
media needs to demand insights from the experts
in the think tanks. The media cooperates with the
think tanks that espouse similar ideologies in order
to seek out their expertise (Rashid, 2013). Bennett
(1990) notes that the range of insights reported by
the media depends on the degree of disagreement
between the government and the legislative elite.
This implies that the growth of think tanks may
change the news. There is an incentive-based struc-
ture of interdependence between the think tanks
and journalists (Anstead & Chadwick, 2018).
Chadwick (2013) further argues that social media
plays a vital role in think tanks as well. However,
Rashid (2013) notes that digital media play rela-
tively less of a role than traditional media in pol-
icy-making for think tanks. Overall, it reflects what
Gamson and Wolfsfeld’s (1993) found in that
movements need the news media for three primary
purposes: mobilization, validation, and scope
enlargement.
Due to the economic revolution and the rapid
development of the media in China, the collabor-
ation between China’s think tanks and the media
has become increasingly intensive. The think tanks’
analyses published in the media are now more
nuanced (Bondiguel & Kellner, 2009). They also
found that foreign policy commentators in the
media are now seen of as the third power in
Chinese foreign policy after the government, think
tanks and universities (Bondiguel & Kellner, 2009).
Qi (2018) suggests that the Chinese media has sig-
nificantly increased the media coverage of think
tanks and engaged in various think tank activities.
Yang (2011, p. 28) discovered that "there are some
specific ways in which Chinese think tanks cooper-
ate with media: participating in the drafting of
Party and Government program documents; releas-
ing of the press conference; and airing govern-
ment’s views at academic gatherings, public events,
and media." In other words, the media is a channel
through which China’s think tanks transmit infor-
mation to the public. Zhu (2011) mentioned that
6 v D. ZHANG
when policymakers draw up different policy options
on a specific topic which has not been formally
accepted, they will try to influence the public opin-
ion through the media first. It could be argued that
China’s think tanks aim to attract media attention
in order to influence national policy-making
(Hayward, 2018). Meanwhile, along with China’s
development, China’s think tanks have started to
transform their role as "soft power agents" to
enhance China’s image and promote China’s inter-
ests (Menegazzi, 2017; Xiao & Dai, 2020). The
think tanks’ collaboration with traditional media
and social media has become increasingly vital.
Overall, the media collaborates with think tanks for
intellectual support in their news reporting and
research while the government expects the media
and think tanks to work together to educate the
domestic and international public on the govern-
ment’s ideology and policies (Qi, 2018).
Methodology
This study used the example of one of the most
prominent think tanks in China to explore the rela-
tionship between mass media and think tanks. This
think tank is ranked relatively high among China’s
think tanks with the rank of TTCSP. Meanwhile,
although this think tank claimed that it is a non-
government organization, it also has a political
background. It was established by former govern-
ment officials and former Chinese diplomats. The
management of the think tank combines govern-
ment funding and independent funding which
should facilitate a more in-depth and broader dis-
covery into how China’s think tanks use the media.
Overall, this article believes that since this think
tank is one of China’s most prominent think tanks
and has unique features, this will facilitate the
author in exploring the relationship between the
mass media and China’s think tanks.
To answer the research question, the author
conducted empirical research in the Public
Relations (PR) Department of the chosen think
tank for six months to observe how the staff oper-
ate and interact with the media. During the obser-
vation period, the author also interviewed two staff
in the PR Department. One was the chief of the PR
department who could offer the whole picture of
the ideology of cooperating with mass media.
Simultaneously, the other one was an intern in
charge of managing the Institute’s social media.
This could offer a more in-depth insight into how
the Institute uses social media. Before conducting
the intensive interviews, the project was fully
explained to the participants and their consent was
given. Both interviewees used the same question-
naire. In terms of the questionnaire, the partici-
pants were required to provide the role that they
play(ed) in the think tank as well as the following
information: the nature of the PR Department, the
relationship between the media and the Institute,
the role of social media platforms, the strategies
when using the media and social media etc. Both
interviews were audio-recorded, and the recordings
were transcribed for analysis, resulting in approxi-
mately 20 single-spaced transcription pages. The
results are based on the author’s observations in
the PR department of the Institute and the answers
of the interviewees.
Results
China’s think tanks and PR department.
Think tanks in China, regardless of the type of
think tanks, are still highly controlled or surveilled
by the Chinese government. The interviewees
revealed that although China’s think tanks have
achieved marketization, they are still profoundly
reliant on state funding. Moreover, the Institute
has close ties with the Chinese authority. The
founding chairman and chief sponsor of the
Institute is a member with a high-ranking position
of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference (CPPCC). Both interviewees also
claimed that although the Institute claims to be an
"independent" organization, all board members are
former Chinese government officials or have close
relationships with the Chinese government. To
answer the Chinese policies’ call, like the "Belt and
Road," the Institute built the "Belt and Road
Institute." Interviewees also mentioned that this
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situation of the Institute does not constitute a sin-
gle case in China.
The role of the staff who work in the PR
department can be divided into three parts: (1) to
contact or socialize with traditional media, (2) to
organize activities and write newsletters or reports,
and (3) to manage the social media platforms. The
staff in charge of maintaining contact with the
media are usually former established journalists or
have close contact with media. Some are in charge
of the Institute’s social media pages. They are gen-
erally responsible for reposting articles from
experts at the Institute which were initially pub-
lished by a traditional media agency in order to
reach the public. Moreover, they are also required
to post newsletters. Every month, all interns have
to calculate the overall number of readerships.
Simultaneously, the staff also find the most popular
articles and their writers seek out engaging topics
for the next month to manage their social media
platforms better.
Official media and institute. The interview-
ees suggested that China’s think tanks build a rela-
tionship with the media through the staffs’
personal ties and its reputation. For instance, over
the years, the Institute has established a method by
which it makes contact with the media: (1) through
recommendations from employees who are former
journalists or who have a good relationship with
the media; (2) through activities to contact the
media; and (3) the media takes the initiative to
make contact with the Institute.
As previously mentioned, the staff in charge of
making contact with the media are usually former
journalists or have a good relationship with the
media. They typically use their sources to contact
the media due to this. For example, one staff mem-
ber is the former chief editor of the Nanfang Daily
and uses his resources to contact the media when
needed. These are the most expressive and viable
ways for the Institute to make contact with the
media. As a think tank, it cannot avoid attending
academic conferences, forums, or meetings. The PR
department staff often participate in these sessions
as well. Furthermore, during a break or at the wel-
come dinner, the team take the opportunity to
socialize with the media and distribute business
cards in order to introduce Institute. The Institute
also has a reputation, and the experts hired by the
Institute are famous in their field. Therefore, when
the media requires experts to explain or provide
commentary on international issues, they will ini-
tially contact the Institute. In other words, now-
adays, the Institute is not only research-oriented. It
has also become a supplier of ideas. Moreover, the
Institute has established an excellent log/data sys-
tem to maintain all of the contact information
derived from the media. The staff have also placed
all of the journalists into one WeChat group. When
the media requires an expert, they will send a
request to the WeChat group. Furthermore, after
the Institute makes contact with them, the media
will send one or two journalists to follow the think
tank. Whenever the Institute holds an activity or
conference, the media will monitor and report on
the relevant activity.
Cooperation with official media. After mak-
ing contact with the media, the Institute usually
builds a cooperative relationship. The methods of
their cooperation include: (1) the Institute supplies
articles or experts for interviews regarding heated
issues; (2) the media attends activities where the
Institute is present and (3) the media and the
Institute cooperate to achieve the completion of a
project. Whenever the media needs comments or
ideas, they will contact the Institute’s staff’s PR
Department. The Institute’s team will then select
an appropriate scholar who meets the require-
ments. However, the interviewees also noted that
all of the materials that the experts write have to
reflect the party and/or the government’s position.
One of the interviewees mentioned a salient
case in order to explain the Institute’s relationship
with the official media. He said two words: “public
diplomacy,” namely that government-censored
“independent” non-governmental organizations can
participate in foreign diplomacy activities in order
to demonstrate and promote the Chinese
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government’s position. The chairman of the
Institute visited South Korea several times in 2017
with his research team in order to talk with various
politicians in South Korea and to find solutions to
the two countries’ relationship during the THAAD.
The interviewees shared their feelings about the
business trip to South Korea. Although the
Institute claim it did not represent the government,
it had a semi-official identity since many highly
positioned officials received us. Moreover, the
Chinese government’s mouthpiece, People’s Daily,
and other influential official media aired the visit.
The news organizations have demonstrated that
the aired news only reflected the Institute’s beliefs,
but all of the information made available reflected
the Chinese government’s attitude. The news not
only showed the Institute’s condemning attitude
towards the Korean government, but it also pushed
the Korean government to stop THAAD.
Moreover, the Institute wrote a few self-generated
stories on some of the former high-ranking Korean
officials’ supportive attitude towards China and it
contacted the Chinese official media to publish
them. In other words, the Institute played the role
of promoter, defender, and advocate of the
Chinese government.
Furthermore, when the Institute organizes an
activity or plays a role in an event, the Institute
will generally invite journalists to write a news art-
icle on the activity, highlighting its role. The inter-
viewee highlighted that when the journalists write
these news reports, they usually do not focus on
the activities themselves but instead highlight the
efforts that the Institute puts forth and the political
meaning behind the events. The Institute regularly
participates in drafting the party and government
program documents and it releases information at
scheduled press conferences. Lastly, usually, the
media and the Institute collaborate on one project.
It is interesting to mention that the interview-
ees joked that the media and the Institute have a
"subordinate" relationship. The interviewees further
explained that it does not mean that the Institute
serves or works for the media. It implies that the
Institute values the chance to expose itself outside
of the traditional forms of media. China’s think
tanks regard the official media as the agent or
mouthpiece of the government. China’s think tanks
believe that airing on the national traditional media
(People’s Daily, Xinhua News, Global Times, etc.) is
an award for their organization, reflecting that their
ideas are recognized by the authorities and demon-
strate their close ties with the Chinese government.
Moreover, the interviewees also hinted that the
think tank members have mixed feelings about for-
eign media. On the one hand, foreign media pro-
vides an excellent opportunity to express the
Chinese government’s ideas, boosting the limited
attention that they get from political leaders. They
could show a supportive attitude towards the
Chinese government on foreign media to attract
the government’s attention. On the other hand, the
institute is afraid of talking to foreign media and
even domestic journalists from the Hong Kong
media. When working with foreign media, the
Institute is cautious about their expressions in case
they make a mistake that will annoy the political
elites and the public.
Social media and the institute. The Institute
uses a strategy called "multilevel layout." This means
that the Institute uses numerous social media plat-
forms to appear in front of as many people as pos-
sible. The Institute has seven social media platforms:
Yidianzixun (一点资讯), a TouTiao Page (今日头条),
a Sohu page (搜狐号), a NetEase page (网易号), a
QQ page (企鹅号), a WeChat subscription (微信公
众号) and a Facebook page. The interviewees high-
lighted that the Institute manages its social media
with the aim of garnering more publicity. Social
media platforms provide the perfect opportunity for
ordinary people to learn more about the Institute.
To attract readers, they employ the following strat-
egies: (1) posting five original articles or reposting
articles from the media seven days a week; (2) using
an informal and attractive style to write articles; (3)
focusing on engaging topics and (4) writing a
monthly report.
The articles posted on social media are usually
first-hand articles on current hot issues written by
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experts from the Institute or reports from the
media. The interviewees claimed that the Chinese
public is immensely interested in China’s conflicts
with other countries (trade wars, the THAAD
deployment controversy, the Diaoyu Island con-
flicts, etc.), and domestic unstable political inci-
dents like the Xinjiang incident. The Institute staff
usually choose an engaging topic to post on their
social media pages. However, according to The
State Administration of Radio Film and Television
(SARFT), those topics are sensitive and should not
be mentioned in public. Although the Institute has
close ties with the government, the articles and
perspectives demonstrate China’s positive side; it is
still hard post on the social media page. The staff
who work in Public Relations diligently check and
copyedit the first-hand articles to determine if
there are any sensitive words and to rewrite the
pieces if necessary. To attract more readers, the
authors usually use an attractive and informal style
to write the headlines and often write the title in
the form of a question. Moreover, the Institute staff
write a monthly report to conclude the top five
highest readership articles as a way of seeking out
heated topics and responding to them immediately.
When a new heated issue relating to international
relations occurs, the Institute will quickly assign
scholars to write a commentary on the issue.
However, the interviewees also hinted that the
Institute barely replies to the audiences’ comments
to avoid taking a political position unless they
clearly favor the general government’s interests.
Furthermore, the interviewees noted that the
Institute’s purpose in terms of media usage and
social media utilization has both similarities and
differences. In terms of the nearness of media
usage and social media utilization, the interviewee
hinted that all content has to favor the govern-
ment’s position. It has to defend the government’s
legitimacy and interests. For instance, the Institute
booked hotels owned by the Lotte Corporation dur-
ing its visit to South Korea. However, the Institute
canceled the booking immediately after Lotte pub-
licly supported THAAD. Afterward, the Institute
used its social media platforms to announce the
cancelation of the booking and to condemn Lotte’s
behavior. Both interviewees demonstrated that this
behavior, on the one hand, reveals the ’loyalty’ to
the Chinese government. On the other hand, it
aims to reinforce the Chinese government’s relent-
less attitude towards THAAD in order to trigger
the public’s sense of nationalism to strengthen the
government’s rule. Moreover, when the government
promotes new ideas and policies, both traditional
media and social media utilization play an educat-
ing and promoting role for the public. However,
media usage and social media utilization have
diverse target audiences. The media is used for
government officials, scholars, or individuals who
have specific background information relating to
the field. This is done to influence policy process-
ing or prove the Institute’s high ability and reputa-
tion. However, social media platforms are
purposefully used to garner publicity. In other
words, it is primarily employed to increase the
Institute’s reliability and validity and to promote
the government interests to ordinary people.
Discussion and Conclusion
This study found that China’s think tanks have
Chinese characteristics when operating, which is
aligned with Li and Qi’s (2018) study. China’s think
tanks have a close relationship with the govern-
ment. Many scholars share the same belief in that
think tanks are closely associated with the author-
ities or other political parties, called “(new) parti-
sans” (McGann, 2007) or “party tanks” (McGann &
Weaver, 2017). Furthermore, this study also found
that China’s think tanks mainly depend on govern-
ment funding to operate. Abb (2015) shares the
same idea in that approximately 75% to 85% of the
Chinese think tanks’ budget is from the Chinese
government. It is therefore not surprising that all
of China’s think tanks inevitably have more or less
of an administrative affiliation with the Chinese
government (Li & Qi, 2018; Menegazzi, 2017;
Zhu, 2020).
Although Abb (2015) suggests that state fund-
ing may not directly influence the think tanks’
agenda, this study argues that the national budget
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affects China’s think tanks by making them sensi-
tive to the state demands. It also explains why
most of the think tanks in China built the "Belt
and Road Institute" to cater to the current Chinese
policy. Therefore, because of the central govern-
ment funding, China’s think tanks primarily cater
to current Chinese government’s policies.
Furthermore, this study notes that think tanks play
the role of advocate when exposed to traditional
media as they defend and promote the Chinese
government’s interests and policies. When a
Chinese think tank plays the position of advocate,
it usually publishes articles on mass media plat-
forms, accepts interviews, writes blog posts on the
internet, and delivers public speeches to defend
and promote the government’s interests (Shai,
2004; Zhu, 2011). China’s think tanks prefer to play
the role of advocates because, firstly, their central
funding is mainly from the Chinese government.
Although Abb (2015) suggests that the state fund-
ing will not directly influence the think tanks’
agenda, this article indicates that it will impact
their expression and political behavior. Second,
China’s think tanks are now playing the role of
"soft power agents" to enhance China’s image and
promote the government’s interest (Menegazzi,
2017, p. 93; Xiao & Dai, 2020). The role of the
think tanks is now more like that of an advocate
rather than an adviser. Third, think tanks are reluc-
tant to conflict with the authorities. Zhu (2020)
suggests that political power is deeply embedded in
the Chinese political structure. The orderly hier-
archy is deeply embedded by the political power in
China, and the Chinese "bureaucracy-oriented trad-
ition" profoundly shapes think tanks’ behaviors.
Zhu (2020) also explains that China’s think tanks
mainly rely on administrative linkages instead of
depending on the public debates to achieve influ-
ence. Fourth, this situation is also because the think
tanks’ political behavior is influenced by Confucian
culture. Chinese think tanks refuse to directly
resort to public opinion due to the influence of the
Confucian spirit of "scholar-bureaucrat" (Shidafu)
(Noakes, 2014; Wang, 2008). Furthermore, Zhu
(2020) suggests that traditional Chinese Confucian
culture highlights loyalty. Therefore, in order to
demonstrate their patriotism, China’s think tanks
prefer to play the role of government advocate.
Meanwhile, in China, traditional Chinese media is
either the government’s mouthpiece or it is closely
supervised by the government (Qi, 2018) and repre-
sents China’s government position (Zhang, 2020b).
Political power is embedded in the political struc-
ture, and Li and Cheng (2012, p. 128) note that in
Chinese society, an existing "bureaucracy-oriented
tradition" prioritizes an orderly hierarchy in which
political power is heavily concentrated. Therefore,
it is not surprising that think tanks in China prefer
to play the role of advocate when they are exposed
to the media.
Furthermore, this study also suggests that trad-
itional Chinese Confucian culture and the “bureau-
cracy-oriented tradition” could explain the mutual
relationship between the media and think tanks.
Bondiguel and Kellner (2009) mentioned that the
mutual interaction between Chinese think tanks
and the media is becoming more intensive. This
study found the same pattern in that traditional
Chinese media and think tanks have an inter-
dependent relationship. Bondiguel and Kellner
(2009) further argue that the think tanks in China
still adhere to the traditional policy influence chan-
nels and that they are deeply rooted in the Chinese
culture. In the Chinese traditional Confucian cul-
ture, personal ties or individual networks play a sig-
nificant role in the political structure. Therefore, it
is understandable why China’s think tanks hire for-
mer established journalists to work for them.
China’s think tanks need the former established
journalists’ personal networks to build a close rela-
tionship with traditional Chinese media. Zhu (2020,
p. 298) also further claims that “personal ties
largely depend on the administrative status of the
people in the society in which orderly hierarchy is
deeply embedded by political power.” If China’s
think tanks build a close relationship with trad-
itional media, it reflects that they are recognized by
a higher tier in the hierarchy of political power.
Meanwhile, Chinese “bureaucracy-oriented
tradition” also has a considerable influence on
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political behavior (Michelson, 2007). The Chinese
“bureaucracy-oriented tradition” highlights the
importance of the recognition of the hierarchy of
political power. Therefore, China’s think tanks
regard being aired on the traditional media as an
award for their organization. As previously men-
tioned, traditional Chinese media plays the role of
mouthpiece for the government (Qi, 2018), repre-
senting the hierarchy of political power in China.
In a word, Chinese think tanks’ connection with
political power not only influences their structure
(Zhu & Xue, 2007) but that it also has a significant
impact on their behavioral strategies when it comes
to building a relationship with the media and the
process of influencing policies.
Chinese think tanks have been increasingly
promoting social media since the new millennium’s
start (Bondiguel & Kellner, 2009). This study found
the same pattern in that think tanks usually man-
age 5 to 10 social media platforms and post, on
average, five articles per day in order to gain publi-
city. This study agrees that social media is now
playing a vital role in developing think tanks.
Zhang (2020b) suggests that social media is now
playing a crucial role in China’s politics since it
offers a public sphere to reach the public in turn
(Fang & Repnikova, 2018). This study partially
agrees that social media is a useful tool through
which to approach the public. However, when
examining the case of the social media use of think
tanks, this study argues that social media has a
relatively less real influence on politics while play-
ing more of a role in terms of the think tanks gain-
ing public support. Some scholars suggest that
China’s think tanks are now playing the role of
"soft power agents" (Menegazzi, 2017, p. 93; Xiao &
Dai, 2020). Think tanks utilize social media to
advocate and defend China’s interests and to pro-
mote China’s image among the Chinese public.
Moreover, Fang and Repnikova (2018) sug-
gested that digital media offers Chinese citizens the
space to freely express their position. This study
argues that it is partially true that think tanks have
more room to choose topics on which to write the
articles that are posted on social media and they
can write in a more attractive and informal style to
attract the public. Therefore, social media, to some
extent, liberalizes the think tanks’ political behav-
ior. However, this article argues that it is insuffi-
cient to say that social media could help the think
tanks break the boundary of Chinese Confucian
culture and the "bureaucracy-oriented tradition."
Zhang (2020a) proffers that although viewed as lib-
eral in the Chinese media environment, social
media still follows the traditional media logic that
facilitates the government’s interests. This study
found the same pattern that although think tanks
use social media to write articles and choose topics
of discussion, they still need to follow the rule of
Chinese Confucian culture and the "bureaucracy-
oriented tradition" promoted by the prevailing
Chinese political power. The social media platforms
of think tanks elaborate on the policy agendas to
the public in a layman-friendly and engaging way.
The final purpose of gaining publicity is also
attracting the political elites’ attention and to serve
the authorities. However, unlike McGann and
Weaver’s (2017) finding, this study argues that
China’s think tanks do not play the role of medi-
ator between the government and the public to
offer a constructive forum for exchanging ideas and
policy debates. The Institute barely replied to the
audiences’ comments to avoid being seen to be tak-
ing a political position. Thereby, China’s think
tanks are not autonomous decision-makers, but
play a more role as a defender, promoter and advo-
cates for political authorities.
This study further concludes that the "bureau-
cracy-oriented tradition" of think tanks has features
of being a GONGO. GONGOs mainly receive fund-
ing from the government and public funds as an
extension of the state (Froissart, 2013; Yang, 2016).
Moreover, "GONGOs parallel the activities of trad-
itional NGOs but maintain close government ties,
such as by having current or former government
officials in their leadership" (Yang, 2016, p. 38).
This study found the same patterns in that think
tanks in China have a close relationship with the
government, and that the think tanks are situatd by
the current or former government officials.
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National funding is their primary funding source.
China’s think tanks have features that make them
GONGOs with a semi-official identity. China’s
think tanks air on both traditional media and social
media and defend, promote and advocate for the
government’s interests and policies. Both the think
tanks’ use of the media and social media demon-
strate what the government wants to say. This is
not only because it is under the pressure of the
"bureaucracy-oriented tradition." It is also because
they are part of the authorities although they claim
that they are "independent." Therefore, China’s
think tanks have GONGO features, which means
that the government generally indirectly leads the
direction of the think tanks. In short, the media
use of the think tanks in China is primarily for pro-
moting and defending policies. China’s think tanks
play a more complementary role in relation to the
official authorities when explaining policy agendas
to the public and shaping the public opinion on
social media.
Overall, this study found that China’s think
tanks are GONGOs with a semi-official identity.
China’s think tanks have a close relationship with
China’s government. Furthermore, this study argues
that political power is rooted in the administrative
and personal ties between the political elites and
think tanks. Thereby, the traditional Chinese
Confucian culture and the “bureaucracy-oriented
tradition” significantly impacts on the think tanks’
behavior. It is evident that think tanks prefer to
play a role as advocates and build a close relation-
ship with traditional media due to the influence of
political power, their personal network, and
Chinese traditional cultural values. Since adminis-
trative affiliations and politically embedded per-
sonal networks have a significant impact on the
process of proposing and adopting policy ideas
rather than the expertise offered by think tanks,
there are no competitive thought conflicts with the
authorities. Although social media provides a freer
space for think tanks to use to deliver a political
speech, the social media utilized by think tanks still
follows the logic of traditional media when it
comes to facilitating the government’s interests.
This article also has some drawbacks. This
study only uses one of China’s think tanks as a
sample, thus it may not have uncovered general
answers pertaining to all Chinese think tanks.
However, at the moment, the Institute, as one of
China’s most prominent think tanks, is the perfect
example in which to find solutions. Moreover, this
study only engaged in two interviews plus partici-
pant observation. This is insufficient to determine
and answer the research question properly.
However, the two interviewees were the former
chief of the PR department and a Social Media
Specialist, offering relatively significant insights as a
result. It would be more advantageous to utilize a
quantitative number of think tanks and interview-
ees to determine the relationship between the
media and think tanks in the future. Overall, this
article still believes that it can contribute to explor-
ing China’s think tank industry and its relationship
with the media.
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